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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 52 SUMMER 1978 NUMBER 4
THE IMPACT OF ERISA ON COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING
MONA N. GLANZER*
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, employee retirement benefits have become an
increasingly important issue in the collective bargaining process.
Recognizing the need to safeguard the interests of the "millions of
employees and their dependents [who] are directly affected by
[pension] plans,"' Congress enacted the Employee Retirement In-
come Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).2 While ERISA does not require
employers to make pension benefits available to employees, a plan,
once created, is subject to extensive regulation under the statute.3
* LL.B., 1953, Brooklyn Law School. Member of the bar, New York, U.S. District
Courts, Southern and Eastern Districts of New York, and U.S. Supreme Court.
I Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406, §
2(a), 88 Stat. 829 (codified in 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1976)); see H.R. REP. No. 530, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. 1-2, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4639, 4639-40; S. REP. No.
127, 93d Cong., 2d Sass. 1-2, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4838, 4838-
39.
2 ERISA §§ 2-4082, 29 U.S.C. § 1001-1381 (1976); I.R.C. §§ 401-415. Several provisions
of ERISA also appear in additional, scattered sections of the United States Code.
I ERISA includes within its coverage employee welfare benefit plans, which provide for
medical or hospital care, benefits covering sickness, accident, death, disability or unemploy-
ment, vacation benefits, apprenticeship or training programs, day care centers, scholarship
funds, prepaid legal benefits and benefits under section 302(c) of the Labor Management
Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (1976). See ERISA § 3, 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (1976).
This article will focus solely upon those provisions of ERISA which affect employee pension
benefit plans.
ERISA preempts all state laws governing employee benefit plans, except those relating
to insurance, banking and securities. ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)-(b) (1976); see Cate
v. Blue Cross & Shield, 434 F. Supp. 1187, 1190 (E.D. Tenn. 1977). In Hewlett-Packard Co.
v. Barnes, 425 F. Supp. 1294 (N.D. Cal. 1977), aff'd per curiam, 571 F.2d 502 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3222 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1978), the court ruled that a state healthcare plan
did not control minimum funding, reporting or disclosure standards, but that these provisions
were subject to ERISA. 425 F. Supp. at 1297, 1302. While a state cannot regulate an
"employee benefit plan" by labelling it "insurance," neither can an insurer market an insur-
ance package free of state control by calling it an "employee benefit plan." Bell v. Employee
Sec. Ben. Ass'n, 437 F. Supp. 382, 390 (D. Kan. 1977).
In Azzaro v. Harnett, 414 F. Supp. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), af'd, 553 F.2d 93 (2d Cir.), cert.
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Initially, this Article will review some of the specific require-
ments of ERISA which are likely to be topics of negotiation between
union and employer representatives. The balance of the Article will
be devoted to a discussion of the interplay of ERISA and the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act (NLRA), and particular problems which
may arise during the course of negotiations and after a collective
bargaining agreement has been concluded.
TYPES OF PENSION PLANS
Qualified pension plans under ERISA can be grouped into two
general categories: defined benefit and defined contribution.4 Under
a defined benefit plan, a fixed benefit is guaranteed the employee
at retirement.5 An employer who funds a defined benefit plan is
obliged to make such payments into the fund as are required to
ensure that the promised benefit will be paid upon retirement.' In
contrast, under a defined contribution plan the employee is not
guaranteed a fixed benefit.7 Rather, the plan establishes a contribu-
denied, 434 U.S. 824 (1977), the court held that after the enactment of ERISA only the
Secretary of Labor was authorized to supervise the operation of a pension plan. Thus, the
New York State Superintendent of Insurance was precluded from so doing. 414 F. Supp. at
475. In Wayne Chemical, Inc. v. Columbus Agency Serv. Corp., 426 F. Supp. 316 (N.D. Ind.),
modified, 567 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1977), the court held that where a dispute involves the terms
of an employee benefit plan, the preemption provision of ERISA § 514, 29 U.S.C. § 1144
(1976), clearly implies "that no state statute, regulation, or common law rule, operating of
its own force, may govern any aspect of [the] case." 426 F. Supp. at 320-21. In Wadsworth
v. Whaland, 562 F.2d 70 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 980 (1978), the court examined
the legislative history of ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1976), and found that ERISA
preempted "all state laws that relate to employee benefit plans and not just state laws which
purport to regulate an area expressly covered by ERISA." 562 F.2d at 77 (emphasis in
original). The extent of ERISA's dominance remains unclear. It is certain, however, that
ERISA preempts state control over the supervision and regulation of pension and retirement
plans in those areas expressly covered by the statute.
See generally Comment, The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974: Poli-
cies and Problems, 26 SYRcusE L. Rav. 539, 545-46 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Policies and
Problems].
5 ERISA §§ 3(35), 1015, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(35); I.R.C. § 414(i). Labor Department statis-
tics indicate that, as of 1974, there were 250,000 defined contribution plans and 100,000
defined benefit plans in existence. See Policies and Problems, supra note 4, at 545 n.40, 546
n.42 (citing 120 CONG. REc. 16,552-53 (1974)). See also [LRX] LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 129-30
(1975).
6 See Connolly v. PBGC, 581 F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1978). See also International Ass'n of
Machinists & Aerospace Workers Lodge No. 1194 v. Garwood Indus., Inc., 368 F. Supp. 357,
364 (N.D. Ohio 1973).
A "defined contribution plan" or "individual account plan" is one
which provides for an individual account for each participant and for benefits based
solely upon the amount contributed to the participant's account, and any income,
expenses, gains and losses, and any forfeitures of accounts of other participants
which may be allocated to such participant's account.
ERISA §§ 3(34), 1015(k), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34) (1976); I.R.C. § 414(k).
tion formula which reflects income earned, expenses, gains and
losses and determines the amount contributed to each participant's
account.' The liability of an employer in a defined contribution plan
is limited to the fixed periodic contribution set forth in the collective
bargaining agreement.'
PARTICIPATION AND COVERAGE REQUIREMENTS
In order to qualify under ERISA, all benefit plans must meet
certain minimum participation requirements. For the purposes of
negotiation, the minimum age requirement and the determination
of years of service are most relevant. Generally, a plan must permit
employee participation not later than age 25 or completion of 1 year
of service.'0
Computing years of service poses significant problems. A year
of service is defined as "a 12-month period during which the em-
ployee has not less than 1,000 hours of service."" An hour of service
includes each hour for which the employee is paid or entitled to be
paid' 2 by the employer, and each hour for which the employee has
received backpay, 3 by either a grievance or judicial procedure, up
to a maximum of 501 hours.'4 The above method of computing years
and hours of service is not utilized, however, if the employer uses
the elapsed time method of computing service time, in which case
accrual is based on the total period of employment rather than the
ERISA §§ 3(34), 1015, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34) (1976); I.R.C. § 414(i); see Connolly v.
PBGC, 581 F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1978). Examples of defined contribution plans are profit sharing
plans, stock bonus plans and money purchase pension plans. See S. THOMPSON, PENSION
REFORM: How TO COMPLY WITH ERISA 3-30 (1976).
1 See Connolly v. PBGC, 581 F.2d 729, 732-33 (9th Cir. 1978); International Union of
Operating Eng'rs Local 9 v. Siegrist Constr. Co., 458 F.2d 1313,1315 (10th Cir. 1972); Interna-
tional Ladies Garment Workers Union Local 415 v. Miami Casuals, Inc., 79 L.R.R.M. 2730,
2732 (S.D. Fla. 1971), aff'd per curiam, 79 L.R.R.M. 2732 (5th Cir. 1972).
1" ERISA §§ 202(a)(1)(A), 1011, 29 U.S.C. § 1052(a)(1)(A) (1976); I.R.C. § 410(a)(1)(A).
Maximum age requirements are permissible only under defined benefit or target benefit
plans. ERISA §§ 202(a)(2)(A)(i)-(ii), 1011, 29 U.S.C. § 1052(a)(2)(A)(i)-(ii) (1976); I.R.C. §410(a) (2)(A) (i)-(ii).
It ERISA §§ 202(a)(3)(A), 1011, 29 U.S.C. § 1052(a)(3)(A) (1976); I.R.C. § 410(a)(3)(A).
In seasonal industries, "where the customary period of employment is less than 1,000 hours
during a calendar year," the Secretary of Labor determines what constitutes a year of service.
ERISA §§ 202(a)(3)(B), 1011, 29 U.S.C. § 1052(a)(3)(B) (1976); I.R.C. § 410(a)(3)(B).
12 29 C.F.R. § 2530.200b-2(a)(1) (1977). Hours for which the employee is "entitled" to
be paid notwithstanding the lack of actual service includes time spent on vacation, jury duty,
military leave and leave of absence. Id. § 2530.200b-2(a)(2). Nonworking service, however,
does not include time covered by state workmen's compensation laws, unemployment com-
pensation laws, disability laws, medical plans or severance pay. Id. § 2530.200b-2(a)(2)(ii).
'3 Id. § 2530.200b-2(a)(3).
" Id. § 2530.200b-2(a)(2)(i), (a)(3).
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actual completion of a given number of hours."5 Computation of the
employee's hours of service begins with the first hour of employment
until the date of severance."6 The severance from service date occurs
immediately upon discharge, death, retirement or voluntary termi-
nation. If the employee leaves for other reasons such as disability,
vacation, layoff, or leave of absence, however, the severance date
does not occur until 12 months following the beginning of an absence
from active employment. 17 Thus, if an employee is given a 1-year
leave of absence or layoff from the firm, that period would be in-
cluded as service under the plan. 8 Significantly, an employer would
not use this method of computing service time if layoffs were preva-
lent and if it would have a disruptive effect upon the funding of the
plan. It should also be noted that in the event there is a layoff and
the employee quits or is discharged during the period of layoff and
reemployed within 12 months of the absence, for purposes of eligibil-
ity and vesting, the employee is given full service credit for his
period of severance. 9
Generally, all of the employee's years of service are counted
when determining the minimum service requirements under the
plan. Break in service rules, however, are the exception. 0 If an em-
ployee has a period of 12 consecutive months during which he has
not completed more than 500 hours of service,2 there are three in-
stances where service in prior years will not be counted toward an
employee's minimum service requirements. The first involves a par-
ticipant who has no vested benefits when the break in service be-
gins. The years of service before the break are not included "if the
number of consecutive 1-year breaks in service equals or exceeds
the aggregate number of such years of service before such break."
Second, service prior to a break is not included when determining
whether the employee has satisfied the minimum requirements un-
less the employee completes 1 year of service after his return.2
Third, where the plan provides for full vesting after 3 years of serv-
ice, service prior to a 1-year break need not be included for those
employees who have not met the 3-year eligibility requirement at
Id. § 2530.200b-9(a)(1).
Id. § 2530.200b-9(a)(2)(i).
17 Id. § 2530.200b-9(a)(2)(ii).
Is Id.
Id. § 2530.200b-g(a)(3)(vi), (c)(2)(iii)(A).
ERISA § 1011; I.R.C. § 410(a)(5)(A)-(D).
' ERISA §§ 203(b)(3)(A), 1012, 29 U.S.C. § 1053(b)(3)(A) (1976); I.R.C. § 411(a)(6)(A).
ERISA § 1011; I.R.C. § 410(a)(5)(D).
ERISA § 1011; I.R.C. § 410(a)(5)(C).
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the time of break in service.24
ERISA also requires that certain coverage standards be met
before a plan will qualify. The statute establishes a percentage test
under which a plan will qualify if it covers at least 70% of all em-
ployees,2s or 80% of all eligible employees where at least 70% of all
employees are eligible for membership under the terms of the plan.2 '
Alternatively, a plan will qualify without regard to percentage cov-
erage if it benefits all the employees that "qualify under a classifica-
tion set up by the employer." Concerned that an employer may
unfairly classify employees for purposes of eligibility, Congress
added the proviso that the classification not be discriminatory in
favor of "officers, shareholders or the highly compensated."s An
employer who wishes to set up a classification must receive a deter-
mination from the IRS that the plan does not discriminate in the
proscribed manner.29 It is important to note that the coverage of
employees continues to be a relevant factor even after a plan has
been established, since an initial qualification will not sustain a
plan if it becomes discriminatory in actual operation."
While the provisions of ERISA proscribe classifications based
on an employee's status, both the employer and the union should
be aware of statutes which prohibit employment practices which
discriminate on the basis of age or sex. There has been a widespread
and common practice of forced retirement at the age of 65 due to
4 ERISA § 1011; I.R.C. § 410(a)(5)(B). An additional problem arises for successor em-
ployers since, under John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964), a successor
employer is required to honor an employee's years of service for his predecessor if he continues
the former employer's plan. Id. at 548; see ERISA § 1015; I.R.C. § 414(a)(1). If the successor
institutes a plan unlike his predecessor's, however, the prior years of service would be counted
only in very limited circumstances. ERISA § 1015; I.R.C. § 414(a)(2). But see Fillion &
Trebilcock, The Duty to Bargain Under ERISA, 17 WM. & MARY L. REv. 251, 271 (1975).
2 ERISA § 1011; I.R.C. § 410(b)(1)(A).
'Id.
ERISA § 1011; I.R.C. § 410(b)(1)(B). Eligibility requirements may be modified by
establishing criteria or classifications such as age, length of service or job group. For example,
under a defined benefit plan which provides for 100% vesting after 1 year of service, a
maximum age may be imposed provided the employees began their employment at an age
at least 5 years less than the plan's normal retirement age. ERISA § 1011; I.R.C. § 410(a)(2).
Otherwise, an employer would be reluctant to hire an older job applicant since his full
benefits must be funded within a short period of time. ERISA does not permit exclusion of a
participant who is older than normal retirement age where the plan is set up as a defined
contribution plan.
n Id.
21 Id. Notwithstanding the Internal Revenue Code's prohibition on discrimination in
favor of officers, shareholders or highly paid employees, the plan may distinguish between
current and new employees without losing its qualification status. ERISA § 1011; I.R.C.
§ 410(b)(1)(A); Tress. Reg. § 1-410(a)-3(d)-(e) (1978).
10 ERISA § 1012(a); I.R.C. § 411(d)(1).
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the problems which arise as a result of the continued presence of
employees over the age of 65 on the payroll. The majority of defined
benefit pension plans in existence specify the later of age 65 or the
tenth anniversary of participation in the plan as the normal retire-
ment age. When an employee reaches retirement age, his rights have
fully vested and he is then entitled to terminate his employment
and receive a pension without any forfeiture. Indeed, many plans
make it actuarially disadvantageous to remain an active employee
beyond the normal retirement age. Benefits may stop accruing so
that subsequent earnings will not increase a participant's accrued
benefits. In some plans, if the employee retires after normal retire-
ment age he will receive the same benefit level as if he had retired
at the normal retirement age despite the fact that his life expect-
ancy is now shortened by the number of years he has worked beyond
normal retirement age. Additionally, the employee may not be al-
lowed to begin drawing a pension without actually terminating
employment.
Of relevance to any discussion of plan provisions respecting a
participant's age are the 1978 amendments to the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), which increase the man-
datory retirement age from sixty-five to seventy. 1 The amendments
also provide:
It shall not be unlawful for an employer, employment agency,
or labor organization ... to observe the terms of ... any bona
fide employee benefit plan such as retirement, pension, or insur-
ance plan, which is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of this
chapter, except that no such employee benefit plan shall exclude
the failure to hire any individual, and no such. . . employee bene-
fit plan shall require or permit the involuntary retirement of any
individual specified by section 12(a) of this Act because of the age
of such individual. 32
1 Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978 (ADEA Amendments),
Pub. L. No. 95-256 §§ 1-7, 92 Stat. 189 (amending 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976)). When signing
the bill President Carter remarked: It is a "good step in the right direction .... which
provides fairness and equity in protecting our older citizens from discrimination in employ-
ment." Remarks on Signing H.R. 5383 into Law, 14 WEEKLY Cor'. OF PRES. Doc. 698, 699
(Apr. 6, 1978). The 1978 amendments to the ADEA were enacted, in part, to overturn the
Supreme Court's decision in United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192 (1977). See
H.R. REP. No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
976, 1001; S. REP. No. 493, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. &
An. NEWS 976, 985. In McMann, the Court held that retirement before age 65 could be com-
pelled pursuant to a voluntary plan effective before the enactment of the ADEA, since such
a plan could not have been a subterfuge to avoid the provisions of the ADEA. 434 U.S. at
193, 203.
32ADEA Amendments § 2(a), 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1976).
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Clearly, under the 1978 amendments to the ADEA, employee bene-
fit plans may not be used as a device for imposing mandatory re-
tirement before age seventy; but, it is still necessary to balance the
requirements of ERISA against the provisions of the ADEA.s In this
respect, the recent testimony by a Labor Department official before
Congress is relevant.34 According to this official: neither the ADEA
nor ERISA requires pension plans to credit years of service after
normal retirement age for purposes of benefit accrual;3 neither Act
requires the pension payable to a participant who works beyond the
normal retirement age to be the actuarial equivalent of the pension
he would have been paid at normal retirement age;36 and, if a plan
participant does work beyond normal retirement age, neither the
ADEA nor ERISA requires this pension to begin before actual re-
tirement.37 It is clear that in a collective bargaining situation these
views could not be used as a basis for the unilateral imposition of
mandatory retirement at an age beyond the plan retirement age in
order to comply with ADEA.-"
While the effective date of the increase in the mandatory retire-
ment age is January 1, 1979, 39 the provision denying a plan the right
to involuntarily retire a member takes effect upon enactment, April
6, 1978.40 For non-complying plans established in a collective bar-
gaining agreement "in effect" on September 1, 1977, the effective
date is the earlier of either the termination of the agreement or
January 1, 1980.41 The immediate effect of the legislation is that
plans which have mandated retirement before age 65 are immedi-
ately prohibited from continuing the practice. Employees who be-
come 65 in 1978, however, may still be forced to retire in accordance
with a pension plan provision."
- ERISA § 3(24), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(24) (1976), defines normal retirement age as the
earlier of the normal retirement age as stated in the plan, or the later of age 65 or the tenth
anniversary of participation in the plan. This definition would not be affected by the increase
in age from 65 to 70 under the ADEA Amendments.
U Letter from Donald Elisburg, Assistant Secretary of Labor for Employment Standards,
to Sen. Harrison A. Williams, Jr., reprinted in S. REP. No. 493, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 14,
reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 976, 989 [hereinafter cited as Elisburg
Letter, U.S. CODE CONG.].
" Elisburg Letter, supra note 34, at 15, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. at 99.
u Id. According to Elisburg's statements, the 1978 amendments to ADEA would not
require any additional benefit accruals or actuarial adjustments other than those already
required by ERISA. Id.
3 Id.
31 See notes 130-131 & accompanying text infra.
1 ADEA Amendments § 3(b), 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (1976).
'0 Id. § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2).
41 Id.
42 Compulsory retirement between the ages of 65 and 70 is still permissible for two
1978] ERISA
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
In the area of benefit plans and retirement programs, any
gender-based classifications will be closely scrutinized by the
courts. Most of the sex discrimination problems in the pension area
are related to equating contributions or benefits for females with
contributions or benefits for males. If the contributions remain the
same, it is argued that females should receive lower benefits because
as a group they have an actuarially longer life span. Similarly, many
employers have required higher contributions from females who
wish to receive benefits equivalent to those received by males. Cor-
porate pension plans which require females to make higher contri-
butions to pension plans in order to receive equal benefits, however,
have been held to violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 3
The pension plan in City of Los Angeles v. Manhart" was based on
actuarial tables showing that the average woman lives longer than
the average man and that, therefore, a larger contribution to the
pension plan by females was required for them to receive the same
level of benefits as males.4 5 The Supreme Court struck down the
plan, stating that Title VII "precludes treatment of individuals as
simply components of a racial, religious, sexual, or national class."46
The Court determined that the difference in treatment violated
section 703(a)(1) of Title VII47 because there was no evidence that
any factor, other than the employee's sex, was used to calculate
the different rates of contributions for men and women. 8 When
the only issue in Manhart was the unequal contributions by men
limited classes of employees: executives entitled to immediate nonforfeitable pensions of at
least $27,000 per year, and tenured college and university faculty members. The latter exemp-
tion expires on July 1, 1982. Id. § 3(a), 29 U.S.C. § 631. The executive class is narrowly defined
to include only those employees who have occupied executive or high policy making positions
for at least 2 years immediately prior to retirement. Id.
," 42 U.S.C. 88 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976).
435 U.S. 702 (1978).
Id. at 704-05.
" Id. at 708. When Manhart was before the ninth circuit, the court refused to accept the
argument that actuarial distinctions were permissible under the "bona fide occupational
qualification exception" of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1976). 553 F.2d 581, 587 (1976). For any
differentiation to fall within the statutory exception, it must be "reasonably necessary to the
normal operation of that particular business or enterprise." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1976).
Under this standard, the court held that greater contributions by women were not necessary
to the department's function of providing water and power to the residents of Los Angeles.
553 F.2d at 587. Assuming that a "relevant business function" of the department was to
provide a sound pension plan, the court further held that the statutory exception was inap-
plicable to the defendant's plan, since "providing a financially sound pension plan [would
not require] an actuarial classification based wholly on sex." Id. According to the ninth
circuit, the Department of Water could have provided substantial benefits without distin-
guishing between the sexes with respect to the amount of retirement contributions. Id.
'7 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (19-76).
435 U.S. at 711-13.
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and women to an employer-operated pension fund, the Court did
suggest that it would not be unlawful for an employer to have such
an employee make an equal contribution and with this "purchase
the largest benefit which his or her accumulated contributions
could command in the open market."4 It is clear, however, that
the courts will not look favorably upon gender-based classifications.
VESTING
ERISA requires that at some point the employee's right to re-
ceive retirement benefits must become nonforfeitable.ss These mini-
mum vesting standards5 apply to both employee and employer con-
tributions and may be satisfied in any one of four ways.5 - The first
method requires 100% vesting after 10 years of service" and the
second requires 25% vesting after 5 years of service and 5% per
annum thereafter until 100% vesting is achieved after another 15
years. 4 The third alternative is the Rule of 45 under which there
must be 50% vesting when the combination of the employee's age
and his years of service equals 45 .- Under this approach, the em-
ployee's rights must be fully vested when the combination equals
55.58 The final possibility, the 4-40 vesting rule, provides for 40%
vesting after 4 years, an additional 5% in the fifth and sixth year
and 10% thereafter, resulting in 100% vesting after 11 years.5
The method of vesting is crucial in determining which employ-
ees receive the maximum benefits under the terms of the plan.
Under the first alternative, although it is possible not to have any
vesting at all until the completion of 10 years, the employee will be
fully protected after 10 years of service. 8 This plan is perhaps the
" Id. at 717-18. In a separate opinion, Chief Justice Burger pointed out that actuarial
tables based on gender have been utilized since 1843 and their accuracy has often been
validated. 435 U.S. at 725-26 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Addi-
tionally, the Chief Justice reasoned that Congress did not intend to prohibit use of actuarial
findings when the data is based upon longevity and not sex. Id. (Burger, C.J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
51 See note 112 infra.
' ERISA §§ 203, 1012, 20 U.S.C. § 1053 (1976); I.R.C. § 411.
52 ERISA §§ 203(a)(2)(A), 1012, 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(2) (1976); I.R.C. § 411(a)(2).
ERISA §§ 203(a)(2)(A), 1012, 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(2)(A) (1976); I.R.C. § 411(a)(2)(A).
ERISA §§ 203(a)(2)(B), 1012, 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(2)(B) (1976); I.R.C. § 411(a)(2)(B).
5' ERISA §§ 203(a)(2)(C), 1012(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(2)(C) (1976); I.R.C. §
411(a)(2)(C).
1' ERISA §§ 203(a)(2)(C)(i), 1012(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(2)(C)(i) (1976); I.R.C. §
411(a)(2)(C)(i).
Rev. Proc. 75-49 (1975).
H.R. REP. No. 807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 55, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 4670, 4720-21.
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most easily understood by employees and employers because of the
elimination of the costs of recordkeeping for partially vested rights.
The second alternative, the graded vesting method, defers complete
vesting until a relatively late date. It does minimize the cost of
establishing a new plan or improving benefits under an existing
plan, particularly from an employer's point of view. Moreover, the
number of employees with at least 25% vested rights will be in-
creased under the graded vesting method. 9 The "Rule of 45" was
designed to benefit the older employee since it takes into account
age as well as years of service. 0 The 4-40 rule is usually required in
what is believed to be an abuse situation. The IRS would seek this
form of accelerated vesting if, upon investigation, it was determined
that there was a high percentage of employees whose services were
terminated before their accrued benefits vested or if there were rea-
son to believe the plan tends to discriminate in favor of officers,
shareholders or highly paid employees."
FUNDING
Another factor to be considered by an employer and the union
in establishing a pension plan is the means of funding the trust from
which benefits are to be paid. While the means of funding pension
trusts is the responsibility of union and management, ERISA does
provide safeguards to prevent the underfunding of benefit plans.12
5, S. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 21, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 4890, 4904-07.
See Policies and Problems, supra note 4, at 574.
See I.R.C. § 411(d)(1); H.R. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 276-77, reprinted in
[1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5038, 5057-58.
" ERISA §§ 302, 1013, 29 U.S.C. § 1082 (1976); I.R.C. § 412. ERISA requires an em-
ployer to contribute, in equal installments, amounts necessary to meet normal costs and
amortize unfunded past service costs. ERISA §§ 302(b)(2)(A), (B), 1014(b)(2)(A)-(B), 29
U.S.C. §§ 1082(b)(2)(A), (B) (1976); I.R.C. § 412(b)(2)(A)-(B). Plan costs are merely esti-
mates which can vary with actual experience. Overestimation, causing an employer to con-
tribute more funds than required, results in an experience gain, while underestimation results
in an experience loss.
These minimum funding requirements, however, are not absolute. If an employer can
demonstrate to the Secretary of the Treasury that a "substantial business hardship" will
result from imposition of such standards, the Secretary may waive the standards for 1 plan
year, up to 5 years during any 15-year period. ERISA §§ 303(a), 1014(d), 29 U.S.C. § 1083(a)
(1976); I.R.C. § 914(d). "Substantial business hardship" includes, but is not limited to,
operation at an economic loss, ERISA § 303(b)(1), 1014(d)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1083(b)(1)
(1976); I.R.C. § 412(d)(2)(A), substantial unemployment in the business, ERISA § 303(b)(2),
1014(d)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. 1083(b)(2) (1976); I.R.C. § 412(d)(2)(B), decline in industry sales
and profits, ERISA § 303(b)(3), 1014(d)(2)(C), 29 U.S.C. § 1083(b)(3) (1976); I.R.C. §
412(d)(2)(C), and plan discontinuance if the waiver is not granted, ERISA § 303(b)(4),
1014(d)(2)(D), 29 U.S.C. § 1083(b)(4) (1976); I.R.C. § 412(d)(2)(D). Congress has set forth
the following liberalized standard for determining waivers:
ERISA
Major ERISA provisions in this area include: stricter minimum
standards of funding to ensure that normal, yearly plan costs are
met and outstanding unfunded liabilities for past service are de-
creased;13 an increase in the maximum allowable deduction for con-
tributions exceeding the minimum amount;"' creation of a funding
standard account;15 establishment of a Joint Board for the Enroll-
ment of Actuaries66 in order to facilitate control and review of the
process of funding by the government; and more stringent discipli-
nary measures for failure to satisfy the new funding standards. 7 It
is clear that these statutory safeguards are designed to make union
and management trustees accountable for the method of funding as
well as the actual funding of benefit plans established through the
collective bargaining process. 8
[S]ubstantial business hardship . . . will only occur in situations where the em-
ployer did not foresee, and could not reasonably have been expected to foresee (at
the time the plan . . . was established), the event which causes the business hard-
ship.
HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, PRIVATE PENSION TAX REFORM, H.R. REP. No. 807, 93
Cong., 2d Sess. 82, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4670, 4747.
ERISA also permits extension of the amortization requirements for plans established
after January 1, 1974. Normally, unfunded past-service liability is amortized over a 30-year
period. ERISA §4 302(b)(2)(B)(ii), 1013(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1082(b)(2)(B)(ii) (1976); I.R.C. §
412(b)(2)(B)(ii). The Secretary of Labor may extend this amortization period to a maximum
of 10 years if "such extension would carry out the purposes of the [Act] and . . . provide
adequate protection for [plan] participants." ERISA §§ 304(a), 1013(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1084(a)
(1976); I.R.C. § 412(e). Because pre-ERISA plans were not required to amortize past debt
service liabilities, plans existing before 1974 are granted in the first instance a 40-year amorti-
zation period to reduce accumulated liabilities. ERISA §§ 302(b)(2)(B)(i), 1013(a), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1082(b)(2)(B)(i) (1976); I.R.C. § 412(b)(2)(B)(i); see HousE Comm. ON WAYS AND MEANS,
PRIVATE PENSION TAX REFORM, H.R. REP. No. 807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 24, reprinted in [1974]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4670, 4673.
- ERISA §§ 302, 1013, 29 U.S.C. § 1082 (1976); I.R.C. § 412.
64 ERISA § 1013(c)(1); I.R.C. § 404(a)(1)(A), (D). Contributions above the minimum
standards entitle employers to deduct plan costs in equal amounts over 10 years. Id.; see
Policies and Problems, supra note 4, at 601-03.
e ERISA 84 303-304, 29 U.S.C. 48 1083-1084 (1976).
Id. §§ 3041-3042, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1241-1242.
Id. §§ 501-502, 1013(b), 29 U.S.C. 84 1131-1132; I.R.C. § 4971. Failure to comply with
the minimum funding provisions subjects an employer to enforcement proceedings by the
Secretary of Labor. ERISA § 502(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(5) (1976). In addition, an excise
tax equivalent to 5% of the funding deficiency may be imposed by the Secretary of the
Treasury. ERISA § 1013(b); I.R.C. § 4971(a); see S. THOMPSON, PENSION REFORM: How To
COtPLY wnTH ERISA ch. 8 (1976); Policies and Problems, supra note 4, at 605-06.
1 An employer would consider the concept of employee contributions more favorably
than a union, since the employee's contributions will either increase the benefits the employee
will receive or reduce the employer's contribution. See 43 Fed. Reg. 14,010 (1978). In bargain-
ing over the wisdom of employee contributions, unions will claim that the employer has a
deductible factor for his contributions whereas the employee's contributions are made with-
out the tax dollar. Furthermore, employee contributions do, of course, reduce the amount of
take home pay, thereby placing a greater need for increased wages. Both employers and
unions should be concerned with the issue of employee contributions, particularly if it would
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PENSION PLAN FIDUCIARIES
ERISA section 3(21)(A) defines a fiduciary as one who
exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control re-
specting management of such plan or exercises any authority or
control respecting management or disposition of its assets, (ii)...
renders investment advice for a fee or other compensation, direct
or indirect, with respect to any moneys or other property of such
plan, or has any authority or responsibility to do so, or (iii) ...
has any discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in
administration of such plan. 9
A fiduciary of a pension plan must discharge his duties solely
in the interests of the participants and beneficiaries0 by working to
provide maximum benefits and to defray expenses incurred in ad-
ministering the plan. ERISA requires a fiduciary to act "with the
care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then
prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar
with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like
character and with like aims."7
A fiduciary is personally liable to the plan for any losses result-
ing from a breach of any of his responsibilities, obligations or du-
ties72 and no plan provision can relieve him of this liability.73 If there
appear that the plan itself might be jeopardized under the percentage participation require-
ments. If employee contributions are required, but prove to be so burdensome that lower paid
employees are effectively kept out of the plan, the plan may not qualify. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-
3(d) (1977); see notes 27-30 and accompanying text supra.
69 ERISA § 3(21)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (1976). The term fiduciary may also en-
compass persons designated by the named fiduciaries to carry out their responsibilities. Id.
§ 405(c)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 105(c)(1)(B).
7o Id. § 404(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1).
7, Id. § 404(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B). Under the common law, a trustee was
required to "exercise such care and skill as a man of ordinary prudence would exercise in
dealing with his own property." RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRusTS § 174 (1959); see Exchange
Trust Co. v. Doudera, 270 Mass. 227, 229, 170 N.E. 73, 74 (1930). It has been suggested that
ERISA imposes a higher degree of care on pension plan trustees. See Policies and Problems,
supra note 4, at 644-45.
" ERISA § 409(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (1976). Subjecting the plan fiduciaries to personal
liability reflects a significant departure from the common law where the trustees were not
considered parties to the contract and therefore were not liable under traditional contract
principles. See, e.g., Lewis v. Mearns, 168 F. Supp. 134 (N.D. Va. 1958), aff'd per curiam,
268 F.2d 427 (4th Cir. 1959); Napoli v. Unkel, 38 LAB. CAs. (CCH) $ 66,009 (County Ct.
Suffolk County 1959). Moreover, since fiduciaries normally act without supervision of the
employer, they will be solely liable for their unlawful conduct. See Nicholson, Collections and
Settlement under ERISA, 29 LAB. L.J. 364, 367 (1978).
" ERISA § 410(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1110(a) (1976). Only by allocating specific responsibilities
to other fiduciaries, id. § 405(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1105(b)(1), or by appointing a trust manager
pursuant to ERISA § 405(d)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1105(d)(1), may the trustees be relieved of their
statutory duties.
1978] ERISA
are two or more fiduciaries, each must use reasonable care to pre-
vent the others from committing a breach.74 ERISA does permit
plan insurance coverage against liability for losses incurred by rea-
son of an act or omission of a fiduciary,75 but the policy must permit
recourse by the insurance company against the fiduciary. In effect,
there must be a recourse insurance policy in addition to the original
policy in order to cover the individual fiduciary and this second
policy may not be expensed to the plan.
ERISA requires trustees to serve for the sole and exclusive ben-
efit of participants and beneficiaries. If we accept the assumption
that a union-appointed trustee would be more liberal than an em-
ployer-appointed trustee in bestowing benefits, the question arises
whether that would serve to disqualify union trustees automatically
for failure to preserve the assets of the trust or, in the alternative,
disqualify employer trustees for failure to serve for the sole and
exclusive benefit of participants and beneficiaries. The answer to
this question appears to be no. The union-appointed trustee would
be subject to the restraint of ERISA and would be required to per-
form within those limitations. This would be equally true for em-
ployer trustees. In Toensing v. Brown78 those eligible for retirement
benefits in a carpenter's pension trust fund brought suit against the
trustees alleging a violation of section 302(c)(5) of the LMRA77 for
74 Id. § 405(b)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1105(b)(1)(A). A fiduciary is liable for the acts or
omissions of a co-fiduciary if:
(1) . . . he participates knowingly in, or knowingly undertakes to conceal,
an act or omission of such other fiduciary, knowing such act or omission is a breach;
(2) . . . by his failure to comply with section 404(a)(1) in the administration
of his specific responsibilities which give rise to his status as a fiduciary, he has
enabled such other fiduciary to commit a breach; or
(3) . . . he has knowledge of a breach by such other fiduciary, unless he
makes reasonable efforts under the circumstances to remedy the breach.
Id. § 405(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1105(a).
75 Id. § 410(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1110(b). Plan insurance may be purchased by a plan itself,
an employer, a union or a fiduciary. Id. In multi-employer plans the union would most likely
insure their own designated trustees, and the costs of covering non-union fiduciaries would
be apportioned among the employers. A single employer might insure its fiduciaries under a
general corporate policy; however, it must provide broad and detailed coverage to meet the
liabilities imposed by ERISA. Since there is a 6-year statute of limitations under ERISA
for the breach of fiduciary duties, id. § 413, 29 U.S.C. § 1113, coverage of former fiduciaries
should be continued until expiration of the limitation period.
1' 374 F. Supp. 191 (N.D. Cal. 1974), aff'd, 528 F.2d 69 (9th Cir. 1975).
n A cause of action for breach of fiduciary duties is also available under the Labor
Management Relations Act (LMRA) which is aimed at protecting employees from possible
corruption and abuse of power occurring during the collective bargaining process. LMRA §
302, 29 U.S.C. § 186 (1976); see Arroyo v. United States, 359 U.S. 419, 425-26 & nn.6-8 (1959);
United States v. Annunziato, 293 F.2d 373, 379-80 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 919 (1961).
Section 302 makes it illegal for an employer to pay or agree to pay, or for an employee or
union representative to request or accept, any payment or loan. LMRA § 302(a), (b), 29
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granting pension increases more favorable to active employees than
to retired employees. At least two employee trustees of the fund also
served as collective bargaining representatives for the union. There
was no question, however, that their actions complied with the
collective bargaining agreement. 8 The court noted that Congress
enacted section 302(c)(5) "believing that the trust fund was best
managed when the contending views of employer and union were
resolved in the best interests of the beneficiaries."79 It did not, ac-
cording to the court, prohibit a person from serving both as a collec-
tive bargaining representative and as a trustee of the fund,"0 espe-
cially where the petitioners did not allege unfair representation,
arbitrary and discriminatory conduct, or bad faith on the part of
the union." Presumptively, trustees should not be placed in unten-
able, conflicting roles since ERISA requires motivation for the sole
and exclusive benefit of the participants and their beneficiaries.
This requires trustees to resist attempts by either the union or
U.S.C. § 186(a), (b) (1976). Employer payments into a pension fund are specifically excepted
from this general prohibition by LMRA § 302(c)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5). Pension funds must
be kept separate from other union funds, id. § 302(c)(5)(C), 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5)(C), and
the employer and the union representatives must administer the fund jointly, id. §
302(c)(5)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5)(B). Willful violations of these provisions is a misdemeanor
and subjects the offender to fines of up to $10,000, imprisonment for up to 1 year, or both.
Id. § 302(d), 29 U.S.C. § 186(d). Application of § 302(c), however, was often inconsistent and
failed to protect adequately the interests of employees. See Allied Chem. Workers Local 1 v.
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., Chem. Div., 404 U.S. 157 (1971). In response to these shortcom-
ings, Congress enacted ERISA which sets forth detailed prohibited transactions, see note 82
infra, and permits direct recourse to the federal courts, see Nicholson, supra note 72, at 366.
79 374 F. Supp. at 200 & nn.12, 14.
71 Id. at 195.
Id. Suggesting that administrative decisions of trustees are, to some extent, affected
by the collective bargaining process, the court encouraged the trustees to refer to the collec-
tive bargaining agreement in administering the pension plan. Id. at 196. The court stated that
it "would be anomalous to impose upon trustees, as representatives of the employer and
union, a duty to ignore the terms agreed upon by the employer and union." Id. To rule
otherwise would cause the trustee to have "schizophrenic duties" arising from "conflicting
roles." Id. In affirming, however, the ninth circuit expressed a contrary view with respect to
the effect of the collective bargaining agreement on the trustees' duties: "trustees have a duty
to exercise their independent judgment in administering trust funds established under § 302."
528 F.2d at 72 (emphasis added). The court emphasized that "[rlecommendations of collec-
tive bargaining parties .. . are not binding or obligatory." Id. The trustees' action was
upheld even though two trustees "may have had a misconception about the weight . ..
accorded to [collective bargaining] recommendations," since 10 of 14 trustees considered the
increases and unanimously accepted them. Id.
al 374 F. Supp. at 202 (citing Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967)). In Toensing, the
court indicated that a union's ability to represent effectively its members depended on "its
strength in the workplace." 374 F. Supp. at 203. Therefore, in representing both active and
retired employees, the union might naturally prefer the interests of active employees over
those of retirees. Id. (citing Allied Chem. Workers Local 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.,
Chem. Div., 404 U.S. 157, 173 n.12 (1971)).
the employer to utilize the trust fund for their own purposes. The
adoption of proposals recommended by one side, however, is not in
and of itself arbitrary and capricious action by the trustees.
Clearly, regardless of whether trustees are union or employer
appointed, they have the affirmative obligation to prevent any
transaction prohibited by ERISA. The trustees in the due perform-
ance of their duty, however, may seek exemptions from the prohib-
ited transactions provisions.12 The bases or conditions needed to
obtain a variance should be a subject of bargaining, but the require-
ments of the collective bargaining agreement should not be control-
ling upon either the Secretary of the Treasury or the Secretary of
Labor if granting an exemption is necessary to preserve the trust.
The responsibilities of fiduciaries should be considered part of
the negotiation process. If agreed-upon qualifying conditions are
merely a reaffirmation of the statute, ERISA would control and
such conditions could not be challenged. If either party's demands
go beyond ERISA requirements, however, the free choice of the
other party could be limited, thus resulting in a violation of a basic
tenet of labor law which is to have both labor and management
participate as trustees. The negotiating parties are permitted, how-
ever, to limit the ability of the trustees to control the appointment
of trustee-employees of the other party by creating additional cri-
teria for qualification.8s
Challenging Fiduciary Action
Where a fiduciary denies a claim for benefits by a plan partici-
pant or beneficiary, ERISA requires that the aggrieved party be
given adequate notice in writing setting forth the specific reasons for
the denial." In addition, the claimant must be given the opportun-
ity to obtain review of the adverse decision by a fiduciary designated
in the plan.s Beyond these internal procedures, the claimant may
sue in federal court to recover benefits. 6 Judicial review of the fidu-
t Section 406 of ERISA specifically forbids fiduciaries from using plan assets for his own
benefit, engaging in any transaction which would adversely affect the plan, and receiving any
personal consideration in connection with a plan transaction. ERISA § 406(b)(1)-(3), 29
U.S.C. § 1106(b)(1)-(3) (1976). Additional financial transactions are rendered impermissible
by ERISA § 407, 29 U.S.C. § 1107. Exemptions from these prohibited practices are provided
in ERISA § 408(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b).
'* Id. § 403(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1).
Id. § 503, 29 U.S.C. § 1133; see 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(g)(1) (1977). The regulations
outline the minimum requirements of review procedures, which enable a claimant or his
representative to "[r]equest a review upon written application to the plan; . . . [rjeview
pertinent documents; and. . . [s]ubmit issues and comments in writing."
ERISA § 503, 29 U.S.C. § 1133 (1976).
u Id. § 502, 29 U.S.C. § 1132.
1978] ERISA
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:531
ciary's determination, however, is limited to the question whether
the action was arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion.17
As previously discussed, ERISA imposes personal liability on
trustees for breach of their fiduciary duties.m Failure to conform to
strict standards of conduct gives rise to a cause of action for any
losses resulting from the breach. 9 Where the complaint alleges vio-
lation of the trustee's statutory obligations, the courts will apply the
"prudent man standard" 0 in reviewing the trustee's actions.9 By
enumerating specific proscribed transactions and establishing a lib-
eral standard of review, ERISA clearly expands the ability of plan
participants and beneficiaries to challenge fiduciary actions.
Where suit is commenced against a fiduciary, problems may
arise if a right of recourse is available under the collective bargain-
ing agreement. Although ERISA specifically provides a civil cause
of action to plan participants and beneficiaries, when there is an
agreement to arbitrate in the collective bargaining agreement, reso-
lution of disputes by arbitration generally has been favored. Conse-
quently, if a plan provided for arbitration of benefit claims in which
the basic requirements of due process were satisfied, both federal
and state courts would decline initial jurisdiction. Illustrative of the
judiciary's deference to the arbitration process is LMRA section 301,
which requires exhaustion of contractual remedies. 2 Thus, actions
" See Bueneman v. Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 572
F.2d 1208, 1209 (8th Cir. 1978); Riley v. Meba Pension Trust, 570 F.2d 406,410 (2d Cir. 1977);
Rehmar v. Smith, 555 F.2d 1362, 1371 (9th Cir. 1976); Danti v. Lewis, 312 F.2d 345, 348 (D.C.
Cir. 1962).
See notes 72-74 & accompanying text supra.
Section 409 provides:
Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any of the
responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by this title shall
be personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from
each such breach, and to restore to such plan any profits of such fiduciary which
have been made through use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary, and shall be
subject to such other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem appropri-
ate, including removal of such fiduciary. ...
ERISA § 409, 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (1976); see Policies and Problems, supra note 4, at 658-59.
See note 71 supra.
11 See, e.g., Morrissey v. Curran, 567 F.2d 546, 548-49 (2d Cir. 1977); Nedd v. Thomas,
92 L.R.R.M. 2177, 2209 (D.C. Pa. 1976). In Nedd, an action was brought to compel the
fiduciaries to collect payments due to the pension fund. Because the employers were operating
under serious financial difficulties, the trustees had not enforced their obligations to the fund.
Id. at 2205. While the court recognized that a tolerant approach may have been reasonable
under the circumstances, id. at 2207-08, it felt that common prudence would have required
the trustees to exercise greater diligence in pursuing the delinquencies under the plan. Id. at
2215. Thus, even tolerance by the trustees will not insulate them from liability for failure to
collect payments where such failure jeopardizes the fund itself. See Nicholson, supra note 72,
at 367.
1' Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 658-59 (1965).
under section 301 for "violation of a contract between an employer
and a labor organization" will not be entertained unless there has
been exhaustion of the agreed arbitration remedy by the suing
party. It is clear that prior to ERISA, arbitration of benefit claims
was greatly favored by Congress and the courts."
Under the provisions of ERISA, however, a different conclusion
has been reached with regard to arbitration. In Lewis v. Merrill
Lynch,94 the court held that a prospective agreement to arbitrate
disputes arising out of termination of employment could not be
used to compel the former employee to forego his action under
ERISA and submit to arbitration. 5 Lewis, upon employment with
Merrill Lynch, signed an agreement to arbitrate disputes arising
out of employment or termination of employment. The Merrill
Lynch Pension Plan had a forfeiture provision if the employee
joined a competitor business. Prior to his termination Lewis was
informed that his pension rights were 100% vested but, after
joining a competitor, he was informed that his pension rights were
forfeited. Lewis brought suit under ERISA and Merrill Lynch
sought to stay the action pending arbitration. In denying the stay,
the court balanced the strong federal policy favoring arbitration
with ERISA's desire to give pension plan participants maximum
protection. The court stated that the congressional intent of allow-
ing ready access to federal courts could be frustrated by allowing
employers the freedom to require agreements to arbitrate ERISA
claims as a condition precedent to participation in a plan. Acknow-
ledging the strong policies favoring prior agreements to arbitrate,
the court nevertheless found that the promises of ERISA to pen-
sion plan participants are best kept by holding prospective agree-
ments to arbitrate ERISA claims invalid.9 It is reasonable to
conclude that by enacting ERISA, the court stated, "Congress in-
" See Smith v. Union Carbide Corp., 350 F.2d 258, 260-61 (6th Cir. 1965); Lieberman v.
Cook, 343 F. Supp. 558, 562-63 (W.D. Pa. 1972).
" 431 F. Supp. 271 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
" Id. at 277-78.
' Id. at 273.
9' Id.
" Id. at 274-75. The court noted that ERISA grants potential plaintiffs a wide choice
of Federal court venue, liberal service of process rules, and relief from the requirement of
$10,000 in controversy. In addition, § 502(d)(1) specifically makes an employee benefit plan
a "suable entity." 431 F. Supp. at 274. A deadlock in voting between the employer and the
employee-trustees on a jointly trusted fringe benefit fund may be determined by arbitration
under LMRA § 302(c)(5)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5)(B) (1976). See ERISA § 514(d), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144(d) (1976). In addition, ERISA does not divest an arbitration panel under the Railway
Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 157-158 (1976), of its exclusive authority to resolve disputes arising
under a collective bargaining agreement. See Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. Northwest Airlines,
Inc., 444 F. Supp. 1138 (D.D.C. 1978).
" 431 F. Supp. at 277-78.
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tended to [grant protection to] plan participants from arbitration
and similar agreements, often unilaterally imposed, which 'snip
and whittle' at federally granted rights,"'' 0 similar to the protec-
tion afforded securities purchasers under the securities laws.'0 '
ERISA AND THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT
Generally, employee pension plans are subject to regulation
under both ERISA and the NLRA. The relevant sections of the
NLRA are 8(a)(5) and 8(b) (3)0" which place a mandatory obligation
on employers and employee representatives to bargain in good faith
concerning "wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment."03 Wages, for the purposes of the NLRA, have been held "to
include emoluments of value, like pension and insurance benefits,
which may accrue to employees out of their employment relation-
ship."'0 4 It is important to recognize that the applicability of ERISA
'0 Id. at 276.
0I Id. at 274-75. In weighing the federal policy favoring arbitration against the remedies
available under ERISA, the court compared ERISA with other federal laws which grant
judicial resolution of disputes arising under them. Since arbitration clauses have not been
enforced where relief is available under the securities laws, id. at 274, the court found that
"[t]he Congressional purpose behind ERISA dictates that it should receive a similar inter-
pretation." Id. at 275 (citing Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953)). According to the court,
both ERISA and the securities laws were passed to protect pension plan participants and
investors who
are in similar circumstances, at the mercy of pension plan sponsors and administra-
tors or securities sellers and brokers, each better informed and in a superior bargain-
ing position. In addition, a pension plan participant is in reality an indirect securi-
ties investor, making his investments through an institutional intermediary, his
pension plan. . . . The same potential which exists for fraud and overreaching
between securities sellers and purchasers exists between pension plans, their spon-
sors and administrators as pension "sellers" and plan participants and beneficiaries
as "buyers." In short, a pension plan participation is in many ways comparable to
a security ....
431 F. Supp. at 275.
102 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), (b)(3) (1976).
NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976).
,01 Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247, 251 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S.
960 (1949) (quoting In re Inland Steel Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1, 4 (1948)). But see Allied Chem.
Workers Local 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., Chem. Div., 404 U.S. 157 (1971) (bargaining
over rights of retired employees is permissive). The Inland Steel court reasoned that even if
pension and insurance benefits were not considered "wages," they would still fall within the
ambit of § 9(a) of the NLRA under the phrase "other terms and conditions of employment."
170 F.2d at 251. One author viewed the Inland Steel decision as a "significant impetus to
pension growth" because it "elevated the pension issue to a formal bargaining posture."
Policies and Problems, supra note 4, at 543. The significance of an employer's duty to bargain
over pension plans is illustrated by Plumbers Local 519 v. Service Plumbing Co., 404 F. Supp.
1008 (S.D. Fla. 1975). In Plumbers, the union had entered into a collective bargaining agree-
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in no way affects the duty to bargain imposed by the NLRA.
Although implementation of pension plans is a mandatory sub-
ject of bargaining,0 5 a union may waive its statutory right to de-
ment with Service Plumbing Co. (Service), which provided for a pension plan. Id. at 1009-
10. Included in the agreement was a provision stating:
If an Employer ... controls or operates any other business within the trade and
territorial jurisdiction of the Union, such other business entity shall either have a
signed Agreement with the Union or this Agreement shall be interpreted as includ-
ing such business entity under the term "Employer."
Id. at 1010. In violation of this provision, Service established the AJA Plumbing Co. (AJA)
which did not make benefit contributions for its employees to the pension plan. Id. at 1012.
The union and plan trustees brought suit against Service and AJA to enforce the terms of
the pension plan against AJA. Id. at 1009-10. The court concluded that the activities of the
two defendant corporations were so "intertwined and related" that Service and AJA were a
single corporate entity and were thus bound by the contractual obligations of one another.
Id. at 1013. Among the factors considered relevant by the Plumbers court were: commingling
of funds, interchanging employees, common officers, shareholders and executives, and shar-
ing of expenses and salaries. Id. at 1012. Under such circumstances the court held that the
corporate entity could be disregarded to insure protection of employees' rights under the
collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 1013 (citing Fisher v. Cast, 114 F.2d 177, 191 (10th
Cir. 1940)).
M Any term in the collective bargaining agreement which relates to "wages, hours, and
other. ..conditions of employment" is a mandatory subject of bargaining, NLRA § 8(d),
29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976), and refusal to bargain with respect to such terms is a violation of
the NLRA. Id. § 8(a)(5), (b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), (b)(3); see NLRB v. Borg-Warner
Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958). Matters not deemed a condition of employment are permis-
sive and bargaining is discretionary for both employers and employee representatives. Id.
Generally, unless the issue involved is likely to have a substantial impact on employees' job
rights and security it will be deemed a permissive subject. See, e.g., NLRB v. Adams Dairy,
Inc. 350 F.2d 108, 110-11 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1011 (1966); General Motors
Corp., 191 N.L.R.B. 951, 952 (1971), petition for review denied sub nom. International Union,
United Auto. Aerospace and Agricultural Workers v. NLRB, 470 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
Collective bargaining is defined as
the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative
of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect
to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation
of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written
contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party ....
NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1976). Subjects of bargaining which have been held to be
mandatory include: stock purchase plans, Richfield Oil Corp., 110 N.L.R.B. 356 (1954),
enforced, 231 F.2d 717 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 909 (1956); grievance procedures,
Hughes Tool Co. v. NLRB, 147 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1945); profit sharing plans, Dickten & Masch
Mfg. Co., 129 N.L.R.B. 112 (1960); and contracting work lreviously performed by employees
to independent contractors, Fiberboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
The employer's duty to bargain includes the duty to furnish all information necessary to
the union's performance of its bargaining obligation. In Milgo Indus., Inc., 229 N.L.R.B. 25,
enforced, 567 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1977), an employer was held to have violated § 8 of the NLRA
by withholding information concerning revised costs of its pension plan despite repeated
requests by the unions. Such information was deemed by the NLRB to be relevant to the
union's effort to bargain. 229 N.L.R.B. at 30. The second circuit, however, found that the
employer had not violated the LMRA by failing to supply the union with a copy of its
standard Blue Cross/Blue Shield health plan because a copy of its provisions could have been
easily obtained. 567 F.2d at 543. An employer's refusal to furnish the union with information
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mand negotiations.' 6 If a waiver is successfully proven, it can be
raised as a defense to an unfair labor practice charge under the
NLRA.' °0 Waiver of this statutory right, however, must be "clear
and unmistakable." ' A union will be deemed to waive its right to
bargain with regard to pensions if the parties have fully discussed
the subject during the course of negotiations, even though pension
plan negotiations are not mentioned in any written documents.10 If
the plan was not a subject of negotiation, the waiver should be
included in the collective bargaining agreement."10
concerning its obligation to contribute to a fringe benefit fund has been held to be a violation
of § 8 of the NLRA. Ellsworth Sheet Metal Inc., 224 N.L.R.B. 1506 (1976), supplemented,
[1977-1978] LAB. L. REP. (CCH) (NLRB Dec.) 18,610. In Ellsworth, the employer was
ordered to produce his "payroll records, cash disbursements journal, general ledger and
general journal,. . . payroll reporting forms and annual. . workman's compensation insur-
ance carrier. . . reports." 224 N.L.R.B. at 1506. The administrative law judge set forth the
standard for reviewing § 8 violations as follows:
Section 8(a)(5) of the Act obligates an employer to provide, on the request of its
employees' collective bargaining agent, all information relevant to the proper per-
formance of that agent's functions, including information needed by the Union to
police and administer the collective bargaining agreement. This right arises by
operation of the statute upon an appropriate request and limited only by considera-
tion of relevancy.
224 N.L.R.B. at 1509; see Stahl Specialty Co., 175 N.L.R.B. 129, 130 (1969); Cowles Commu-
nications, Inc., 172 N.L.R.B. 1909, 1909 (1968).
The broad disclosure provisions of ERISA require notice to employees of the plan descrip-
tion, eligibility requirements, vesting, funding, participation and forfeiture provisions, and
the types of benefits provided. It is suggested that this increase in knowledge will enhance
the bargaining position of the employee representatives. See Fillion & Trebilcock, supra note
24, at 267.
10 See Tide Water Assoc. Oil Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 1096, 1098 (1949).
o See Jacobs Mfg. Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1214, 1218 (1951), enforced, 196 F.2d 680 (2d Cir.
1952).
10 Tide Water Assoc. Oil Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 1096, 1098 (1949).
tO See Crest Beverage Co., 231 N.L.R.B. No. 25 (1977); Jacobs Mfg. Co., 94 N.L.R.B.
1214 (1951), enforced, 196 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1952); cf. N.L. Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 536 F.2d
786 (8th Cir. 1976) (employer ordered to bargain over pension benefits absent prior negotia-
tions). In NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 211 F.2d 622 (8th Cir. 1954), the court held that once
parties had specifically negotiated over insurance and hospitalization benefits, the union
waived its right to bargain further over these matters, even though they did not appear in
the agreement.
110 Tide Water Assoc. Oil Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 1096, 1098 (1949). Although the collective
bargaining agreement in Tide Water contained a management function clause, the board held
that the union had not waived its right to bargain over retirement benefits. Similarly, in
Jacobs Mfg. Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1214 (1951), enforced, 196 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1952), the employer
was ordered to bargain with the union on the subject of pensions upon the union's request. A
reopening clause to "discuss wage rates" was not deemed a waiver of pension discussions
where there was no written pension plan and the subject had neither been discussed during
the negotiations nor mentioned in their contract. 94 N.L.R.B. at 1214-15.
ERISA
The Collective Bargaining Process
Once negotiations over a pension plan begin, the standards
embodied in ERISA present several important bargaining issues.
For example, in considering one of the four methods of vesting"' the
average length of service and age of the employees will render one
formula more attractive to the employee over another. The em-
ployer, however, will seek adoption of an alternative which mini-
mizes his costs without placing an extra burden on his bookkeeping
and accounting departments. It should be noted that, on these sub-
jects, the employer's bargaining power has been significantly re-
stricted since ERISA expressly limits the situations where vested
rights may be forfeited." 2
Of significant importance to both sides will be the type of plan
to be adopted: defined benefit or defined contribution." 3 In most
cases the employer will opt for a defined contribution plan, since his
liability is limited to the plan assets and termination insurance is
not required. The union, on the other hand, will bargain for a de-
fined benefit plan which guarantees employees a certain amount
without respect to the actual accumulation of employer contribu-
tions. Since an employer's obligation to an employee benefit plan
is believed to be controlled by the negotiation process and defined
by the terms of the collective bargaining agreement,"' it is particu-
larly important that the parties make certain that the desired type
of plan is clearly stated in the written agreement. The significance
of this point is illustrated by Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corp."5 In Connolly, an operating engineer pension trust was estab-
lished pursuant to a multi-employer agreement."6 Eleven employers
' See notes 50-57 & accompanying text supra.
112 Prior to ERISA, employers would include forfeiture clauses in their plans which re-
quired loss of vested rights if an employee was discharged, laid-off, or absent beyond a stated
period of time. Under ERISA §§ 203(a), 1012(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a) (1976); I.R.C. § 411(a),
forfeiture of vested rights is permitted only in a few limited situations: where the employee
dies before normal retirement, ERISA §§ 203(a)(3)(A), 1012(a)(3)(A), 29 U.S.C. §
1053(a)(3)(A) (1976); I.R.C. § 411(a)(3)(A); where a retired employee continues to work and
is covered by the same plan, ERISA §§ 203(a)(3)(B), 1012(a)(3)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(3)(B)
(1976); I.R.C. § 411(a)(3)(B); and, where an employee with less than 50% vested interests
discontinues his required contributions, ERISA §§ 203(a)(3)(D)(i), 1012(a)(3)(D)(i), 29
U.S.C. § 1053(a)(3)(D)(i) (1976); I.R.C. § 411(a)(3)(D)(i). In addition, a plan may still impose
forfeitures for the period of time prior to vesting if its provisions for vesting are more liberal
than the minimum vesting standards under ERISA. Treas. Reg. § 11.411(a)-.414(c) (1978).
123 See notes 4-9 & accompanying text supra.
I" See, e.g., Connolly v. PBGC, 581 F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1978), rev'g 419 F. Supp. 737 (C.D.
Cal. 1976).
115 581 F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1978).
HI Id. at 731. A multi-employer plan is defined by ERISA §§ 37(A), 1015(0(1); 29 U.S.C.
§ 1002(37)(A) (1976); I.R.C. § 414(0(1) as one:
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agreed to contribute to the fund at a specified rate per month based
upon the employee's hours of service. While the employer's rate of
contribution was fixed in the collective bargaining agreement, bene-
fits were determined by a formula which multiplied an actuarial
pension factor by an employee's pension credit and, where applica-
ble, a prior service credit."7 The value of the pension factor as deter-
mined by the trustees was based upon the nature of the trust's
investments, the amount of income previously earned by these in-
vestments, prior expenses and losses, possible forfeitures of benefits,
mortality rates and any unforeseen delinquencies in employer con-
tributions."' An employee's pension credit was determined by the
number of hours worked, and the prior service credit was based on
services rendered prior to the adoption of the pension plan in 1960."1,
A dispute arose when the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
(A) to which more than one employer is required to contribute,
(B) which is maintained pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement be-
tween employee representatives and more than one employer,
(C) under which the amount of contributions made under the plan for a plan
year by each employer making such contributions is less than 50 percent of the
aggregate amount of contributions made under the plan for that plan year by all
employers making such contributions,
(D) under which benefits are payable with respect to each participant with-
out regard to the cessation of contributions by the employer who employed that
participant except to the extent that such benefits accrued as a result of service
with the employer before such employer was required to contribute to such plan,
and
(E) which satisfies such other requirements as the Secretary of Labor may by
regulations prescribe.
If the benefits are reduced to the rate in effect when the employer first joined the plan, the
remaining employers would be liable for any increases in the benefit level since the withdraw-
ing employer joined the plan. Internal Revenue Service Technical Advice Memorandum
7751002, 107232 (Sept. 17, 1977).
Although the risk of termination under a multi-employer pension plan is substantially
less than under a single employer plan, the former is subject to the insurance provisions of
ERISA. See 581 F.2d at 734; ERISA §§ 302(b)(2)(B), 1013(a), 4006(a)(3)(B), 29 U.S.C. §§
1082(b)(2)(B), 1306(a)(3)(B) (1976); I.R.C. § 412(b)(2)(B). See generally H.R. REP. No. 533,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 17, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4639, 4653; S. REP.
No. 127, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 31, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4838, 4861.
ERISA's provisions, however, take cognizance of the broader economic base and greater
stability of multi-employer plans by extending the number of years in which multi-employer
contributors may amortize past service liabilities from 30 years to 40 years. ERISA §§
302(b)(2)(B)(ii)-(iii), 1013(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1082(b)(2)(B)(ii)-(iii) (1976); I.R.C. §
412(b)(2)(B)(ii)-(iii). Multi-employer stability is further acknowledged by ERISA's provi-
sions for termination insurance premiums at one-half the rate for other pension trusts. ERISA
§ 4006(a)(3)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1306(a)(3)(B) (1976).
"' Under the operating engineers pension plan, the employers' rate of contribution to the
trust multiplied by the hours of employees' service comprised the total amount the employer
was required to contribute to the plan per month. 581 F.2d at 731.
118 Id.
119 Id.
(PBGC)'II refused to classify the plan as a defined contribution plan
and thus exempt from the termination insurance provisions of
ERISA.' 2 ' It was argued that, if the plan was held to be a defined
benefit plan, the potential liability of the employer in the event of
termination would be extended far beyond that contemplated in the
collective bargaining agreement. The district court held for the trus-
tees, finding that to categorize the plan as a defined benefit plan
would "force upon the employer a greater obligation and liability
than he had agreed to in his contract.' '2 2 In reversing the lower
court's decision, the ninth circuit placed little weight on the intent
of the parties. Rather, the court focused on the actual operation of
120 The PBGC is comprised of a board of directors, formed by the Secretaries of Labor,
the Treasury and Commerce, and a seven-member advisory committee recommended by the
board and appointed by the President. ERISA § 4002(d), (h)(1)-(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1302(c),
(g)(1)-(2) (1976). The PBGC was established to encourage voluntary private pension plans,
to provide timely and contiguous payment of pension benefits to plan participants and to
maintain insurance premiums at the lowest level possible without sacrificing effective admin-
istration. See id. § 4002(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1302(a).
"1 581 F.2d at 730. A serious problem ERISA was designed to relieve was loss of pension
benefits caused by plan termination before complete funding. See ERISA § 2(a), (c), 29
U.S.C. § 1001(a), (c) (1976); H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2, reprinted in 11974]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4639, 4639-40; H.R. REP. No. 807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 7,
reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4670, 4671, 4676-77; S. REP. No. 127, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4838, 4838-39. To
guarantee nonforfeitable benefits to employees, ERISA requires plan-termination insurance,
ERISA § 4022(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1322(a) (1976), regulated by the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation (PBGC), id. § 4002(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1302(a). Under ERISA § 4062, 29 U.S.C. §
1362, the PBGC is authorized to make benefit payments in excess of amounts actually in the
pension fund as of the termination date. The PBGC may then proceed against the employer
and collect up to 30% of the employer's net worth as reimbursement for the Corporation's
expenditures. Id. An insurance program is maintained by the PBGC to enable employers to
protect themselves against this liability. Id. § 4023(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1323(a). Excluded from
ERISA's termination insurance requirements are defined contribution or individual account
plans. Id. § 4021(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(1). Defined benefit plans, however, are required
to maintain plan termination insurance. Id. § 4021(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1321(a)(1). If an unin-
sured or underinsured plan is terminated, the PBGC may proceed against delinquent employ-
ers for trust deficiencies up to 30% of the net worth of each employer. Id. §§ 4062(b), 4064(b),
29 U.S.C. §§ 1362(b), 1364(b); Section 4062 of ERISA sets forth the employer's liability to
the PBGC in the event of termination and provides:
(b) Any employer to which this section applies shall be liable to the corporation,
in an amount equal to the lesser of-
(1) the excess of-
(A) the current value of the plan's benefits guaranteed under this sub-
chapter on the date of termination over
(B) the current value of the plan's assets allocable to such benefits on
the date of termination, or
(2) 30 percent of the net worth of the employer determined as of the day, chosen
by the corporation but not more than 120 days prior to the date of termination,
computed without regard to any liability under this section.
Id. § 4062(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1362(b).
In 419 F. Supp. 737, 740 (1976).
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the plan. It was pointed out that the trust funds were pooled, that
no participants had an individual account and that each participant
had the right to receive benefits whether or not his particular em-
ployer contributed on his behalf. 23 On the basis of these findings,
the court held the operating engineers' plan to be a defined benefit
plan rather than a defined contribution plan. 24 This holding thus
extended the liability of the employer far beyond the expectations
of those who were parties to the collective bargaining agreement.
Although the Connolly court was clearly concerned with pro-
tecting the plan participants in the event of termination, it is be-
lieved that the decision places an undue burden on the union with
regard to negotiating pension plans. In practice, most statutory pen-
sion trusts operate on the same "pooled" basis as did the one in
Connolly. It is clear from Connolly that the PBGC takes the position
that this type of pension trust will generally be treated as a defined
benefit plan. The union's past ability to negotiate similar plans was
enhanced by its representation that the employer's contribution to
the plan would be fixed. If, however, the plan is treated as a defined
benefit plan, the employer who participates in such a program is
subject to a fluctuating and uncertain obligation. Clearly, it will be
far more difficult for unions to negotiate pension benefits where the
employer's liability is open ended and uncertain,2 5 the ultimate
"1 581 F.2d at 733.
"2, Id. Noting that the primary concern of Congress in enacting ERISA was the need to
secure retirement benefits for workers, the Connolly court rejected the argument that compli-
ance with ERISA's insurance requirements subjected the employers to greater obligations
than those originally set forth in the collective bargaining contract. Id. at 732. Judge Harper,
speaking for the ninth circuit, stated that extending the employers' liability beyond the
collective agreement was "precisely what the termination insurance provisions of the Act were
intended to do." Id. The Connolly court recognized two statutory conditions a plan must
satisfy to avail itself of the defined contribution exemptions: (1) each participant must have
an individual account under the plan; and (2) the benefit due each participant must accrue
solely from sums accumulated in the individual account. Id. at 733; see ERISA § 3(34), 29
U.S.C. § 1002(34) (1976). The engineers' plan was found not to have satisfied either require-
ment. 581 F.2d at 733. Rather than providing individual accounts, the trust pooled employer
contributions. Id. Moreover, the pension factor formula used in determining the amount due
a participant at retirement did not determine a benefit level based solely on the individual's
accrued account. Id.
The Connoly decision was probably a result of the court's fear that trust assets would
fall short of the benefits owing plan participants under the union contract. 581 F.2d at 731.
The court did note, however, that termination under multi-employer pension plans is less
likely to occur than under single employer plans. Id. at 734; see note 116 supra.
"2 Cost data is often a crucial factor in negotiation of a pension plan proposal. See E.
BEAL, E. WICKERSHAM & P. KIENAST, THE PRACTICE OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 361-66 (5th ed.
1976). Where the union urges an employer to adopt a defined contribution plan, cost informa-
tion is irrelevant since the employer will not incur liability to the trust beyond the fixed
contract rate. Under a defined benefit proposal, however, the union must project annual
result of establishing a defined benefit plan.
Another aspect of ERISA affecting the collective bargaining
process is that employers now have the ability to exclude from a
benefit plan employees who are in all other respects covered in the
collective bargaining agreement. Section 1011 provides that a plan
meets the requirements of ERISA, despite the exclusion of union
members, "if there is evidence that retirement benefits were the
subject of good faith bargaining between. . . employee representa-
tives and . . .employer or employers.""'2 Illustrative of the above
provision is Western Foundries, Inc., '2 where an employer had pro-
mulgated a profit-sharing plan whose summary description ex-
cluded any union member covered by a collective bargaining agree-
ment from participation in the plan where the party's current collec-
tive bargaining agreement did not provide for any unit employee
participation. The employer was further held to have violated sec-
tion 8(a)(5) of the NLRA by refusing to bargain with the union
about the decision to establish the plan.' 28 The employer was or-
dered by the National Labor Relations Board to amend the plan
description by eliminating the disqualification of union members
from participation and to open accounts for union members who
had been disqualified under that plan provision. 21
employer contributions based on the anticipated income, losses and expenses of the trust, the
approximate number of qualified participants and the mortality rate of the retirees.
In ERISA § 1110(b)(2)(A); I.R.C. § 410(b)(2)(A). While an employer may exclude those
employees covered by a union pension plan the employer may not force the excluded employ-
ees to relinquish their interests in the company plan. NLRA § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5)
(1976). If such rights are so forfeited an employer violates NLRA § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. §
158(a)(3).
Where employees covered by the collective bargaining agreement are included within the
employer's plan, he may still make distinctions within the union, based on certain permissi-
ble classes. A class may be based on a specific location, department, or job category. Even
with union consent, however, the employer will jeopardize such a qualification of the plan
by discriminating in favor of officers, shareholders or highly compensated employees. ERISA
§ 1011; I.R.C. § 410(b)(1)(B); see notes 27-29 & accompanying text supra.
1" [1978 Transfer Binder] LAB. L. REP. (CCH) 18,925.
123 Neither profit-sharing nor a profit-sharing plan was discussed during the negotiations
which ultimately led to the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 31,412.
£12 Compare Western Foundries, Inc. [1978 Transfer Binder] LAB. L. REP. (CCH)
18,925, with Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. NLRB, 567 F.2d 1343 (5th Cir. 1978). The court in
Winn-Dixie held the evidence insufficient to support the NLRB's findings that an employer's
retirement and profit-sharing plan violated NLRA § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976),
because it excluded employees covered by their union pension plan. While agreeing that the
employer had unlawfully refused to bargain over continued participation by employees cov-
ered by the union in the company plan, 567 F.2d at 1348, the court stated that "there was no
way to evaluate, or even to identify, the harm flowing to the employees as a result of that
violation," id. at 1351. Thus, the Board's order, similar to the Western Foundries order, was
deemed too speculative and "unduly burdensome" on the employer. Id. at 1352. Although
19781 ERISA
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Finality of the Collective Bargaining Agreement
Since the duty to bargain imposed by the NLRA is continuous,
unilateral termination of a pension plan during or following the term
of a collective bargaining agreement is a violation of section
8(a)(5).11° This was illustrated in Crest Beverage Co., 31 where an
employer was held to have violated section 8(a) (5) by discontinuing
pension, health and welfare contributions upon the expiration of
the collective bargaining agreement. 32 A different conclusion may
be reached, however, where termination is effected under sections
the fifth circuit did not address the issue whether an employer may refuse to bargain on
duplication of benefits, the Winn-Dixie Board had cited Kroger Co. v. NLRB, 401 F.2d 682
(6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 904 (1969), "for the proposition that a company cannot
exclude from participation in a profitsharing plan those employees who acquire a pension
plan as a result of collective bargaining." 567 F.2d at 1347. In Winn-Dixie, the employer
argued that Kroger was not applicable since the Kroger employer offered two plans, one
pension and one profit-sharing, while the union pension plan had no profit-sharing features;
thus, refusal to bargain over the company profit-sharing plan left the union employees with
only the union retirement plan. In Winn-Dixie, however, there were also company profit-
sharing and company pension plans, and the Board held that the employer could not avoid
the Kroger holding merely by consolidating both plans into one package. Id. at 1348.
"Io Master Slack Corp., [1977-1978] LAB. L. REP. (NLRB Dec.) 18,442. In many cases,
language in the plan itself authorizes the employer to amend unilaterally the participation
and coverage requirements without incurring liability under the NLRA. Some plans contain
broad language which reserves the right to amend where necessary to comply with any statute
or rule of law. Similarly, the amendment and termination provisions of a plan itself may
specifically reserve to management the right to amend the plan to the extent necessary to
qualify under the Internal Revenue Code. This is particularly true where there are no alterna-
tives to obtaining qualification status under ERISA. E.g., I.R.C. § 401(a)(11)(A) (require-
ments for joint and survivors annuity). Where, however, ERISA gives the parties options, as
in the vesting provisions, it would seem that negotiations are required even in the face of a
plan provision reserving to the employer the right to amend for qualification purposes.
If negotiations are necessary during the term of a collective bargaining agreement in order
to meet ERISA standards, a no-strike clause in the collective bargaining agreement should
be sufficient to satisfy the requirements for an injunction should a strike occur. See Boys
Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235 (1970). In Boys Market, the Supreme Court
upheld the validity of an injunction prohibiting union members from picketing their em-
ployer. The employer and the union were parties to a collective bargaining agreement which
set forth the procedures whereby controversies arising under the agreement were to be re-
solved. Id. at 238-39. Where a collective bargaining agreement includes a mandatory arbitra-
tion clause, the court concluded that the anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1976), would not bar the courts from enjoining a threatened strike. 398
U.S. at 253-55.
1-, [1977-1978] LAB. L. REP. (CCH) (NLRB Dec.) 18,449.
,12 Id. The employer contended that § 302 of LMRA, see note 77 supra, precluded it from
continuing contributions in the absence of a written agreement. The NLRB, however, already
had rejected such an argument in Vin James Plastering Co., 226 N.L.R.B. 125 (1976). See
also Wayne's Dairy, 223 N.L.R.B. 260 (1976). In Vin James, although there was no written
agreement signed by the employer, the board found that the employer was required to comply
with the LMRA and could not change any conditions of employment without negotiating with
the Union. 226 N.L.R.B. at 130. It was noted that since the employer's conduct indicated an
4041'11 and 404234 of ERISA, which permit plan termination by both
the plan administrator and the PBGC. Where termination is initi-
ated by the plan administrator, there will be little effect on the duty
to bargain since the termination provisions of the collective bargain-
ing agreement will continue to bind the administrator. Where the
PBGC terminates the plan on its own initiative, however, the corpo-
ration is not bound by any term in the plan agreement.'35 Although
the PBGC infrequently exercises its authority to terminate, where
the circumstances warrant termination the bargaining power of the
union will be substantially reduced since the plan provisions would
be rendered unenforceable.
The question of the employer's post-agreement duty to bargain
may arise in other contexts. For example, an employer who is unable
to satisfy the minimum funding standards for a plan year without
substantial business hardship may apply to the Secretary of the
Treasury for a waiver.' 6 Similarly, an extension of the amortization
period may be obtained from the Secretary of Labor if he determines
that the extension would provide adequate protection for the partic-
ipants and beneficiaries under the plan and that failure to grant an
extension would result in either a substantial risk to the voluntary
continuation of the plan or a significant curtailment of pension
benefits to employees.'37 When an employer seeks a waiver from
either the Secretary of the Treasury or the Secretary of Labor the
question arises whether the employer must first bargain with the
union. The union position would be that neither agency should con-
sider such a waiver unless the union has concurred; however, this
would in effect give unions a veto power over the Secretary of the
Treasury and the Secretary of Labor. It is clear that the congres-
sional intent of both provisions would be frustrated by such a bar-
intention on its part to be bound by the terms of the agreement, it was estopped from
establishing its failure to sign the agreement as a defense. Id. at 130-31.
Among the activities mentioned in Vin James were the employer's payment of wages as
provided by the contract, his deduction of union dues from the employees' paychecks, and
his general compliance with the terms of the agreement. Similarly, in Crest, the Board held
that an employer could not discontinue payments to the pension fund even though the
collective bargaining agreement containing the terms of the plan had expired. Although there
was some evidence indicating that the employer and the union had reached an impasse in
negotiating a new contract, the Board further held that the employer was permitted to make
unilateral changes only if consistent with offers previously rejected by the union. [1977-1978]
LAD. L. REP. (CCH) (NLRB Dec.) 18,449.
' ERISA § 4041, 29 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976).
' ERISA § 4042, 29 U.S.C. § 1342 (1976).
' See Fillion & Trebilcock, supra note 24, at 287-88.
' E.g., ERISA § 303(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1083(a) (1976); see note 62 supra.
" ERISA § 304, 39 U.S.C. § 1084 (1976).
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gaining obligation since the ability to protect the plan participants
and beneficiaries and to maintain the stability of the plan could be
curtailed, or at least hampered, by the negotiation process.
Problems may also arise where an attempt is made to modify
the employer's obligation to the plan by amending the collective
bargaining agreement with the consent of the union. A case arising
in the milk industry, Hurd v. Hutnick, 3 is significant in this re-
spect. Under the pension program in Hurd, booklets were given to
employees along with the formal plan document. The booklet prom-
" 419 F. Supp. 630 (D.N.J. 1976). Many cases in this area involve attempts by trustees
of separate trusts to extend the employers' obligation by merging the trusts. One case of
significance dealing with the enforceability of a merger agreement is Brewery Workers Pen-
sion Fund v. New York State Teamsters Conference Pension and Retirement Fund, 89
L.R.R.M. 2316 (Sup. Ct. Queens County), aff'd mem., 49 App. Div. 2d 755, 374 N.Y.S.2d
590 (1st Dep't 1975). In Brewery Workers, the trustees of two pension funds agreed to merge
trusts subject to employee ratification and IRS approval. Section 6058 of the Internal Reve-
nue Code provides in pertinent part:
(a) In General.-Every employer who maintains a pension, annuity, stock
bonus, profit-sharing, or other funded plan of deferred compensation. . . shall file
an annual return ....
(b) Actuarial Statement in Case of Mergers, etc. - Not less than 30 days
before a merger, consolidation, or transfer of assets or liabilities of a plan described
in subsection (a) to another plan, the plan administrator. . . shall file an actuarial
statement of valuation evidencing compliance with the requirements of section
401(a)(12).
ERISA § 1031(a); I.R.C. § 6058.
Section 401(a)(12) of the Internal Revenue Code provides:
A trust shall not constitute a qualified trust under this section unless the plan
of which such trust is a part provides that in the case of any merger or consolidation
with, or transfer of assets or liabilities to, any other plan after September 2, 1974,
each participant in the plan would (if the plan then terminated) receive a benefit
immediately after the merger, consolidation, or transfer which is equal to or greater
than the benefit he would have been entitled to receive immediately before the
merger, consolidation, or transfer (if the plan had then terminated). This paragraph
shall apply in the case of a multiemployer plan only to the extent determined by
the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.
ERISA § 1021(b); I.R.C. § 401(a)(12). The employees of the plaintiffs fund did ratify but
the defendant fund elected not to abide by the agreement. The defendant alleged that after
execution, one of the participating employers in the plaintiff's fund, Rheingold Brewery,
closed, resulting in a reduced work force and reduced pension contributions. The court did
not review the possibility of an increased burden on the defendant's fund or its contributing
employers under ERISA and held that the integration agreement was valid and enforceable.
89 L.R.R.M. at 2317. It is thus incumbent upon both trustees and negotiators to carefully
review the possibility of financial hardship prior to effectuating such agreements. In small
funds the percentage of liability can be adversely affected by such agreements which may be
beyond the control of any one participating employer. Under Brewery Workers, an employer
who was a contributor to the merged fund would assume the liability of both funds and, under
the ruling in Connolly, see notes 115-125 & accompanying text supra, could have his liability
greatly extended beyond what was initially contemplated by the collective bargaining agree-
ment.
ised benefits "for life" once a retiree's application was approved .'3
The pension fund suffered due to a decrease in the number of con-
tributing employers and the number of employees for whom contri-
butions were made, and a simultaneous increase in the number of
retirees. It became apparent to the trustees that an increase in the
amount of contributions was necessary to cover the existing obliga-
tions of the trust fund as well as its future obligations. Eventually,
the collective bargaining agreement was amended by deleting the
provision for requiring continued contributions to the fund. It was
agreed that thereafter each employer would establish a separate
plan. The problem of insufficient capital remained, however, and
the fund was unable to continue benefits for the existing retirees.
Dissatisfied with the terms of payment under the new plan, the
retirees brought suit alleging that the employers and the union
could not agree to extinguish pension funds by eliminating further
employer contributions to the funds without providing for the finan-
cial protection of the former employees who retired and who were
already receiving benefits.' The court framed the issue before it as
follows:
When employers who have previously entered into a multi-
employer pension plan find the plan too expensive to maintain,
may they enter into a new agreement with the union extinguishing
the pension fund by eliminating further contributions to it... ?141
Finding that employers were committed to make contributions
solely by virtue of the collective bargaining agreements, the court
nevertheless held that they would not be able to abandon the fund
since it would be inequitable to permit the reasonable and justified
expectations of those employees who had been advised that* they
would be paid benefits "for life" to be frustrated.4 2 The eniployers
,31 419 F. Supp. at 641. In Hurd the pension trustees were authorized to regulate the
terms and conditions of the benefit program. Id. at 639. Pursuant to this power, the trustees
issued a schedule of qualifications and benefits which provided that each participant" 'shall
receive on retirement a pension for his lifetime' or 'may voluntarily retire at a pension for
his lifetime.'" Id. at 641 (emphasis in original). Neither the collective bargaining agreement
nor the trust agreement guaranteed a lifetime pension to employees. Id. at 655.
"I Id. at 637. Nine of the dairy owners in Hurd contended that retirees were entitled only
to the amount of assets accumulated as of the November 30, 1975, termination date. Id. at
642-43. One owner argued that since its pension fund payments were determined by the
number of employee hours worked, its duty to contribute ended when the dairy ceased
operations. Id. at 643-44. Another owner contended that it had never been a party to the
collective bargaining agreement establishing the pension trust and, therefore, had no obliga-
tion under the pension agreement. Id. at 643.
" Id. at 637.
2,2 Id. at 651-56. The court in Hurd focused its analysis on two questions: whether the
pensioners' rights had vested; and, if so, whether such rights extended only to amounts
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were required to make payments to the fund to secure the pensions
of current retirees. Thus, while retirees could not sue for anything
beyond what had been initially promised them, the employer and
union could not agree to change the collective bargaining agreement
to the detriment of retirees already receiving benefits under the
original agreement. 1 3
CONCLUSION
While ERISA does not appear to have affected the duty to
bargain imposed by the NLRA, it does have implications with re-
spect to the collective bargaining process itself and the issues that
may arise after an agreement is concluded. Labor negotiators must
be attuned to ERISA's scheme for protecting plan participants and
beneficiaries. The applicable provisions relating to vesting, partici-
pation and the obligations of plan fiduciaries require close scrutiny
of plan terms before a collective bargaining agreement is concluded.
It is especially important for the employer to be aware that the plan,
as set forth in the collective bargaining agreement, generally will be
considered binding by the courts and that attempts to circumvent
agreed upon obligations will be closely scrutinized.
remaining in the fund as of its termination date. Id. at 653. Applying New Jersey law, the
court found that vesting entitled the pensioners to benefits which could not be reduced or
eliminated. Id. at 654. Moreover, the court reasoned that lifetime benefits were guaranteed
because representations made during collective bargaining were relied on by employees who
opted for retirement. Id. at 655. An express disclaimer of employer liability included in the
collective bargaining agreements did not authorize the employers to discontinue pension
benefits. The disclaimer provided "that the agreement [was] limited to contribution without
guarantee of benefits by Union or Employer." Id. at 638. The court determined that since
the disclaimer was deliberately deleted in subsequent collective bargaining contracts, id. at
638-39, it was no longer operative. In any event, the court held that the disclaimer did not
limit the duration of benefits to a period less than life but, rather, was intended to avoid
liability for possible actuarial errors in the level of benefits. Id. at 654 n.5.
"I Id. at 654. But see Toensing v. Brown, 528 F.2d 69 (9th Cir. 1975). In Toensing,
pension plan trustees adopted a proposal to increase benefits for participants retiring after
July 1, 1971. 528 F.2d at 71. Pensioners who retired prior to July 1, 1971, brought suit against
the trustees, claiming that the limited increase was arbitrary, capricious and a breach of the
trustees' fiduciary duty. Id. The court held that the trustees' action was a rational and valid
exercise of authority. Id. at 72.
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